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ABSTRACT
The aim of the article is to analyze the separatist tendencies in the Balkans, which occurred after the 
end of the war in Yugoslavia, and reaching the Dayton Peace Agreement, in the light of international law. 
The article will present the most important antagonisms of ethnic character, which constitute examples 
of new generation of contemporary separatism: Serbian separatism in Bosnia and Herzegovina, a conflict 
with Albanian minority in Macedonia, Albanian-Serbian conflict in Kosovo. Separatisms in the Balkans 
pose a threat to the security and stability of the relations in Europe.
While solving the research issue, the following research methods have been adopted: analysis, synthesis 
and case studies. The inquiry of the literature has enabled the confrontation of the author’s own reflec-
tions with present research findings. The structure of the article consists of 7 parts: “Introduction”, “The 
Balkan War”, “Bosnia and Herzegovina after Dayton”, “Macedonia (North Macedonia)”, “Montenegro”, 
“Kosovo”, and “Conclusions”.
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INTRODUCTION
Reflections on separatism are usually based on the grounds of two notions – the 
nation and the state. A nation pursues and consequently tries to retain its identity 
or independence because sovereignty, or, to a lesser extent, autonomy, create the 
possibility of realisation of its interests. The exemplification of such an activity 
is a national secession, expressed in the thrive for the creation of a sovereign and 
independent state or joining some other entity [see: Ryabinin 2017: 5–9]. 
It is important to point at the difficulties in defining the term “separatism”. It 
can manifest in various forms of different kind. Its dynamics does not depend only 
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on the group (i.e. ethnic groups) but is also shaped by the environment, i.e. oth-
er ethnic-national groups and other state organisms. To assess the magnitude and 
functions of this phenomenon it is important to consider its specific and historical 
circumstances. Therefore, one has to be cautious when making generalisations and 
comparing (classifying) similar phenomena, appearing in various historical periods, 
and fulfilling different functions [Dobrowolski 1995: 90–91].
The moderate factions of the separatist movements which accept democracy and 
the rules of law negotiate with the central government and use their prerogatives to 
extend the autonomy of their region. However, they leave some margin of discretion 
for changing the attitude when it is considered favourable. The aim of a stronger 
radical faction is the separation of a region and the collapse of the state, so in such 
a situation it is more difficult to reach a compromise. The aims, structure and methods 
of separatist movements are not identical.
A new entity may become the source of tensions when within the society some 
national minorities appear. Animosity towards minorities results in depriving of their 
basic individual and collective rights. The majority of modern separatist movements 
is justified on the grounds of discrimination practices aimed at ethnic minorities 
[see: Pamir 2020]. 
Separatist movements appeal to the rule of self-determination of nations as 
a foundation of their separatist aspiration. It is important to differentiate the internal 
self-determination – the right to take part in governing the country or a self-govern-
ment – and external self-determination – the right to create own state [Czubocha 2012: 
158; Pokalova 2010: 430]. Dominating ethnic groups do not take into consideration 
the fact that they created their own states by separating from the parent state by force. 
Serbia, for example, is opposing the independence of Kosovo, but Serbia itself was 
created on a similar rule, i.e. by secession from Turkey [Czubocha 2012: 190–191].
In such polities as […] the United States the most numerous group (White Anglo-Sax-
on Protestants) were so hegemonic that it is hard to imagine any situation in which they 
could feel seriously threatened. The situation, however, is different in multinational states 
in which the dominant nation is an incomplete hegemon (e.g. Yugoslavia, Czechoslo-
vakia). In such cases, a number of different historical situations can call into question 
the dominant nation’s identification with the larger state. The prospect of federalization 
of a unitary state, for example, can lead to a reassertion of national particularism in the 
dominant nation. Grave international crises or negative historical experiences might 
reinforce suspicions among members of the dominant nation about the loyalty of pe-
ripheral nations to the state. In such situations, the dominant group can even question 
its unconditional commitment to a larger state. [Vujačić 2015: 296]
It is important to distinguish separatist fight from creating a new separatist state. 
The separatist fight as a civil war is not forbidden by the international law. However, 
in internal law it happens to be one of the heaviest crimes [Vujačić 2015: 176]. The 
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national groups inhabiting the Balkans are not free from various myths of greatness 
and power, which are the basis for theories of great and glorious Great Albania, Mace-
donia, Bulgaria, Serbia, Croatia or Romania [Piątek 2010: 88; Paruch 2016: 70–71].
THE BAlKAN WAR
The military conflict in the Balkans had three periods: the collapse of Yugoslavia 
(1991–1992), war in Bosnia and Herzegovina (1992–1995) and in Kosovo (1999) 
[see: Górzna 2016a; Górzna 2016b]. The Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia 
(SFRY) consisted of six republics: Serbia, including two autonomous regions: Vo-
jvodina and Kosovo, Croatia, Macedonia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Slovenia and 
Montenegro [see: Grdešić 2019: 28, 36–37, 39–41].
The first wave of separatism was the collapse according to the republican crite-
rium and the creation of six sovereign states from the SFRY, which resulted in local 
wars in the majority of them. Only in Macedonia it was possible, at the beginning, 
to avoid the military conflict. The secession of Slovenia was moderate in severity 
as it resulted only in a few-day struggle against the Yugoslav People’s Army [Sob-
czyński 2013: 224].
The declaration of independence by Slovenia, Croatia, Macedonia and Bosnia 
and Herzegovina contributed to the proclamation of the new Federal Republic of 
Yugoslavia (FRY) by the remaining republics under the leadership of Slobodan 
Milošević (1941–2006). The new state – dominated by the Serbians – undertook 
a series of military actions in neighboring republics aimed at uniting all Serbians in 
a “Great Serbia”. These actions were conducted until the Dayton Peace Agreement 
of 1995 was signed [Ramet 2002: 277–305]. Macedonia and Montenegro separated 
from Yugoslavia peacefully, but the difference was that Macedonia separated in 1991 
from the SFRY and Montenegro from the FRY.
Serbia itself did not avoid the decentralist tendencies because even in the Yu-
goslavian period two autonomous districts were detached – Vojvodina and Kosovo 
Metohija. In the time of the Yugoslavian collapse separatist tendencies appeared also in 
these regions but the national composition of Vojvodina (9 national minorities with the 
dominant position of the Hungarians and a slight prevalence of the Serbians) resulted 
in a situation where no determination for fighting for more than an autonomous status 
appeared which actually was not endangered [Sobczyński 2013: 224]. The separatism 
which Serbia managed to deal with was the attempt of separation, also from Mon-
tenegro, the second historic cradle of Serbianness – the province of Sandžak, which 
is recently inhabited by the Muslim population. Even the autonomous aspirations 
announced in 1991 had not been taken into account [Sobczyński 2013: 225].
The disintegration of the SFRY took a course that surprised both European and 
global public. It was initiated by declarations of independence of the Yugoslavian 
republics and transformed into a military conflict lasting for a few years. Various 
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ethnic and religious factors, the dilemmas of inviolability of borders and self-determi-
nation of nations, the scope of potential interventions and the dispute of who should 
take care of the Balkans were impeding the effective reaction [Bieńczyk-Missala, 
Pronińska 2012: 279].
The Yugoslavian civil war gives an example of the everlasting Balkan antag-
onisms. The collapse of Yugoslavia did not solve all the problems of its national 
groups since the ethnic conflicts and national conflicts in the area still exist, and 
still obstruct the development of the newly created states. It demonstrates the lack 
of clarity according to the rules which the international community should apply 
when dealing with secessions. There was no agreement to the legal character of the 
collapse and the practical approach to the creation process of the new states [Wood-
ward 2020; see: Chomsky 2018: 50–76]. This crisis was focused on the problem of 
Serbian, Croatian and Slovene relations and the international community “declared 
itself happy with what were only partial solutions, ignoring that the problems of all 
six republics were inextricably bound up with one another” [Glenny 2012: 635].
On June 25, 1991, Slovenia and Croatia proclaimed independence. While only 
a sparse population of Serbians lived in Slovenia, a lot more of them resided in Cro-
atia, especially in eastern Slavonia and the region of Krajina, located near the border 
with Bosnia. Croatian Serbians, supported by the Yugoslavian army, opposed the 
Croatian independence. In autumn 1991, the city of Vukovar in Slavonia was under 
siege and bombed by Yugoslavian army for three months. The city was completely 
destroyed. It was the beginning of the Balkan war [Ghesquière 2017: 24; Kuczyński, 
Ray-Ciemięga 2000: 29–41; Šećibović 2005: 123; Bjelajac, Žunec 2009: 230–270].
When it turned out that the independence aspirations of Yugoslavian republics 
resulted in the escalation of military actions on a larger territory, the decision of 
intervention was made (NATO, USA). Due to the lack of determined actions of 
international community in the time when the warfare could have been constrained, 
the violence escalated. The United States of America treated the Balkan conflict as 
an internal European conflict and for a long time its administration denied the need 
of involvement. It considered that the European Economic Community (EEC) is 
responsible for the European stability. The EEC, and later the EU, was not able to 
stop the warfare. Only the failure of the EU policy and the ineffectiveness of UN 
actions, convinced of the necessity of determined actions such as NATO military 
operation and political engagement of the USA [see: Committee on Armed Services, 
U.S. Senate 2000].
Bosnia and Herzegovina was characterized by the most complicated ethnic struc-
ture of all Yugoslavian republics: the Bosnians represented 43.7% of the population 
(Islam), Serbians 31.3% (Orthodox) and Croatians over 17.3% (Catholics). Bosnian 
Muslims are considered as a separate nation both from a religious and a national 
perspective [Klemenčić 1995: 91]. Before it was recognized, many debates and 
discussions about the future of their republic had aroused, mostly among the newly 
created political parties basing on the ethnic identity [Bieńczyk-Missala, Pronińska 
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2012: 280–281]. Its disintegration was caused by three factors: 1) multiethnic charac-
ter of the country, with deep antagonisms and strong national ambiance; 2) unnatural, 
artificial character of the state, imposed by the external factors; 3) lack of integrity 
resulting from the advanced decentralization and a vague division of competences 
among various institutions [Bichta, Wichmanowski 2013: 421].
According to Marek Waldenberg, there were several possible solutions for Bos-
nia and Herzegovina after the recognition of Slovenia and Croatia, none of them 
simple from the practical point of view: 1) division into two parts and joining one of 
them to Serbia and the other to Croatia; 2) division into three parts and the creation 
of an independent Muslim state from the part left after the split with the Serbian 
and Croatian parts; 3) creation of the confederation of Bosnia and Herzegovina or 
a structure between a federation and a confederation of the three national states; 4) 
creation of a unitary state [Waldenberg 2003: 157–158]. 
Similarly to the case of Croatia, the secession of Bosnia and Herzegovina led 
to a military conflict in which the most important factors were the disapproval from 
Belgrade and the ethnic mix on the territory of Bosnia and Herzegovina, preventing 
the satisfactory delimitation of borders. The old antagonisms came to life and led to 
the civil war [Bichta, Wichmanowski 2013: 418; see: Gibbs 2009: 106–140].
The first incidents happened even before the Bosnia and Herzegovina inde-
pendence referendum (February 29, 1992 and March 1, 1992). It was boycotted by 
the Serbians [Składowski 2017: 112–113]. On March 3, 1992, Bosnia and Herze-
govina proclaimed independence and then on March 27, 1992, independence was 
proclaimed by the Serb Republic with the capital in Banja luka (named that way to 
distinguish from the Republic of Serbia), having the objective of joining with the 
new Yugoslavia (consisting of Serbia and Montenegro which was proclaimed on 
April 27, 1992) and the Republic of Serbian Krajina. On the other hand, on July 7, 
1992, the Bosnian Croatians proclaimed the Croatian Republic of Herzeg-Bosnia 
[Radan 2002: 183–187]. After its proclamation the initial fights between Serbians 
and Bosnians alongside Croatians turned into the fights among all three groups. The 
fights involved the neighboring countries of Croatia and Serbia [Timofiejuk 2006: 
149; Eberhardt 2005: 91–97].
During the war, the Serb Republic became a state being fully independent from 
Sarajevo, although it was not recognised by international community. The legal 
foundation of its existence was the constitution adopted on February 28, 1992 by the 
Skupština of the Serbian People [see: Constitution of Republika Srpska 2018]. It was 
supposed to be a monoethnic state of the Serbian people living in Bosnia and Herze-
govina. The decisive influence for its political and constitutional shape remained in 
the hands of the Serbian Democratic Party using the nationalist rhetoric and warning 
against the threats from the Muslims and Croatians [Krysieniel 2012: 203].
The Dayton Peace Agreement, formally signed on December 14, 1995 in Paris, 
changed the existing political system, which installed the multiparty republic with 
bicameral parliament (the Citizens Council of 130 seats and the Council of Munici-
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palities of 110 seats) and the Presidium of the Republic, consisting of three people: 
a Serb, a Bosnian and a Croatian. The constitution of the Republic of Bosnia and 
Herzegovina [see: Constitution of the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina 2018], 
annexed to the General Framework Agreement for Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina, 
introduced the parliamentary-committee system [Timofiejuk 2006: 151; Muś 2013: 
91–120]. The Dayton Peace Agreement did not guarantee the creation of a multi-
cultural society in the area, which for many ages was torn ethnically and religiously 
[Gibas-Krzak 2016: 195; Dahlman, Tuathail 2006: 652–654]. The Dayton documents 
are complex and contradictory and “they have been interpreted both as a blueprint 
for partition and for consolidation of a unitary state” [Glenny 2012: 651]. 
The creation and activity of the Kosovo liberation Army (KlA) contributed to 
the growth of tension. From 1996, the KlA was militarily acting against the Serbian 
administration and the police, not refraining from using terrorist methods. At the 
beginning of 1998, the fights escalated and on February 28, the Serbian troops en-
tered. An international protectorate under the aegis of the UN was formed. Military 
intervention without the authorization of the UN Security Council led to the factual 
secession of Kosovo from Serbia. From the perspective of the previous UN practice 
according to secessions, the western intervention in Kosovo was illegal due to the 
fact that it led to the violation of territorial integrity of a national state. However, 
its consequences have been “legalized” by the international community with the 
reservation that it was an exceptional case [Czubocha 2012: 167–168].
In Kosovo, gross violation of human rights on mass scale took place. In such 
situations international law referring to the human rights authorizes the international 
community to intervene in order to prevent further violations. The minorities fighting 
for biological survival have the right for secession as the remedy to the most serious 
crimes such as homicide and mass ethnic cleansing [Czubocha 2012: 183–184].
NATO members justified their actions by the necessity of avoiding a humani-
tarian disaster as well as the threat for peace and international security. However, 
the intervention took place without an explicit authorization of the UN Security 
Council. This intervention may be treated as a precedent reflecting the formulation 
of a customary norm, according to which the mass human rights violation authorizes 
the use of force when the Security Council is not able to act effectively [Czubocha 
2012: 221–222]. The end of the war came on June 20, 1999 when the last Serbian 
units retreated from Kosovo. After ceasing the military actions and entering the 
NATO troops into Kosovo the Albanian refugees started to return from the camps 
in Albania, Montenegro and Macedonia [Górzna 2016b: 181].
In October 1992, the UN Security Council established the Commission of Ex-
perts to investigate war crimes in the former Yugoslavia, which started its activities 
in November 1992 and concluded its work in April 1994. 
On the basis of the information gathered, examined and analysed, the Commission 
has concluded that grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions and other violations of 
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international humanitarian law have been committed in the territory of the former Yu-
goslavia on a large scale, and were particularly brutal and ferocious in their execution. 
The practice of so-called “ethnic cleansing” and rape and sexual assault, in particular, 
have been carried out by some of the parties so systematically that they strongly appear 
to be the product of a policy, which may also be inferred from the consistent failure to 
prevent the commission of such crimes and to prosecute and punish their perpetrators. 
[Cherif Bassiouni 2017] 
In 1993, the Security Council decided that “an international tribunal should 
be established for the prosecution of persons responsible for serious violations of 
international humanitarian law committed in the territory of the former Yugoslavia 
since 1991” [Cherif Bassiouni 1994: 281]. Milošević was accused of causing armed 
conflict in Kosovo, Croatia, and Bosnia and Herzegovina. He died on 11 March 2006 
and three days later, the Trial Chamber terminated proceedings against the accused 
[see: United Nations International…].
BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA AFTER DAYTON
The contemporary Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina in its current structure 
came to being on the grounds of the Dayton Peace Agreement [The General…]. 
On the one hand, the treaty managed to stop the military actions, but on the other, 
it sanctioned the ethnic division of Bosnia and Herzegovina [Bieńczyk-Missala, 
Pronińska 2012: 281]. It practically authorized the internal division of the country to 
the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina and the Serb Republic [Hladky 2008: 17]. 
The issues of: dealing with war crimes, problems with nationalisms, racial and ethnic 
segregation and the return of refugees were not solved. Moreover, the foundations 
of a modern democratic state were not created [Bichta, Wichmanowski 2013: 422].
It is important to point to a paradox because in the state consisting of two admin-
istration entities – the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina and the Serb Republic 
– the highest is the Office of the High Representative in Bosnia and Herzegovina 
(OHR) which is an institution of informal protectorate of the international commu-
nity in a sovereign state – a solution unique on a global scale [Gibas-Krzak 2011: 
123–124]. On the grounds of so-called “Bonn Powers” of 1997, which were added 
to the peace agreement from 1995, its competences in relation to the legislature and 
the executive were even widened [Banning 2014: 259–302].
For Bosnian elites, the aim is to create strong state structures and a gradual liqui-
dation of the administrative entities, and in their opinion, Bosnia should be divided 
into regions. Croatian elites accept the subjectivity of Bosnia and Herzegovina, how-
ever, they demand a separate administrative entity for themselves. Bosnian Muslims 
and the international community claim the creation of a single Bosnian nation, build 
on the grounds of citizenship, and not ethnicity [Sochacki 2015: 226–227].
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The EU focused on financial aid for the Balkans running programs aimed at 
reducing tensions between the minorities (escalation could destabilize the region) 
and rebuilding of the region after the war. The EU is also an active participant of 
civilian and military missions. However, a number of shortcomings appeared, like 
the lack of experience in running civil and military missions. Some operations are 
conducted prematurely [Pieróg 2016: 53, 60, 69].
In 2005, Bosnia and Herzegovina started negotiating its association with the 
European Union. On June 1, 2015, the Stabilization and Association Agreement 
between the EU and Bosnia and Herzegovina came into force. This decision was 
made to strengthen the relations with the EU and to encourage the country to further 
social, economic and political reforms, necessary for the future integration with the 
EU [Bośnia…]. On February 15, 2016, the country applied for the membership in 
the Union. It was recognized that the lack of further integration could generate more 
problems, social and ethnic conflicts and contribute to the increase of Russian influ-
ence in this region [Gibas-Krzak 2016: 194]. On 18 June 2019, the General Affairs 
Council adopted conclusions on enlargement, stabilisation and association process, 
covering Bosnia and Herzegovina [see: General…].
In 2015, the Bosnian Constitutional Court delegalized the annual (organized from 
1993) Serb Republic Day celebrations. The court took the view that it discriminates 
the Croatians and Bosnians living in the Serb Republic. Milorad Dodik, president of 
the Serb Republic, organized the referendum for the preservation of the celebration 
despite protests from Sarajevo, the UN and the EU. By doing so he undermined the 
constitutional order resulting from the Dayton Peace Agreement. One regiment of 
the Bosnian army was involved in the celebration. It arrived in Banja luka by the 
order of Mladen Ivanić, head of Presidium of Bosnia and Herzegovina, a Serbian 
[Nielegalne…].
In the interview for “Politico”, Dodik said that there would be no secession ref-
erendum in 2018 as proposed by the ruling Party of Independent Social Democrats. 
Despite the western accusations of a stimulation of Serbian nationalism by Moscow, 
he ensured that he never spoke about the secession with Vladimir Putin. He described 
Bosnia and Herzegovina as “a failing state” and criticized the EU which in his per-
spective “has disappeared”. All in all, he indicated not to refuse the perspective of 
secession [Dodik 2018].
It is important to emphasize that if a model of coexistence in a multicultural 
society is to be elaborated on the grounds of historic and political experience of 
Bosnia and Herzegovina, a consensus between all nations and communities of the 
country needs to exist.
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MACEDONIA (NORTH MACEDONIA)
Macedonia (in the international forum presented as “Former Yugoslav Republic 
of Macedonia” – FYROM) came to being in 1991 after the collapse of Yugoslavia. 
According to the preamble to its constitution of 1991, the Republic of Macedonia 
was established as “a national state of the Macedonian people in which full equality 
as citizens and permanent coexistence with the Macedonian people is provided for 
Albanians, Turks, Vlachs, Romanies, and other nationalities” [Constitution of the 
Republic of Macedonia]. According to Jeton Shasivari (South East European Uni-
versity, Tetovo, Republic of Macedonia) this period was 
[…] characterized by the adoption of the Constitution of the country that passed 
without proper inter-ethnic consensus, i.e. RM foundation itself as a sovereign and inde-
pendent state was singled out by nationalist exclusivity of Macedonian politicians versus 
Albanian politicians requirements for the Albanian people as a constitutive subject of 
the country’s constitutional and political system. Consequently, the Constitution of the 
RM did not gain the support of the Albanian MPs from the Democratic Prosperity Party 
(DPP) and the People’s Democratic Party (PDP), which disagreed with the concept of the 
national minority status for Albanians. All this was a reflection of the prevailing attitude 
at the time that the Constitution necessarily must be adopted (impose) at any price, even 
despite the dissatisfaction of Albanian politicians because it meant the imposition of the 
will through the tyranny of the majority. […] [T]he main protagonists of the time, admit 
that it didn’t exist visionary outlooks for the rights of Albanians in the country namely 
that the Constitution was a big mistake or that do not clearly told what Macedonia would 
be constructed in the future. [Shasivari 2013: 191–192] 
Shasivari proposes 
[…] the promotion of Federalism in scientific, political and democratic way as 
amodel of territorial (vertical) split of state power in the center through a process of 
replacing of the existing Constitution with the new one, because the Federalism provides 
an efficient governance with ethnic, religious, cultural, historical, social and political 
diversity in countries where it functions, and fully respond to the main circumstances of 
Republic of Macedonia. [Shasivari 2013: 203]
One of the biggest problems of the country was the Albanian separatist tenden-
cies, fueled by the events taking place in neighboring Kosovo. In 1992, the Albanians 
proposed the creation of an independent republic of Illiryda within the Macedonian 
state, and in 1993, they were preparing a military takeover, which was detected 
[Gibas-Krzak 2009: 41–42]. Albanian aspirations concerning the Macedonian lands 
are less known due to the late awakening of their national identity.
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The presence of Albanian minority greatly influences the internal situation and 
foreign politics. In 2001, in the effect of an Albanian rebellion, terminated due to the 
EU, NATO and OSCE negotiations, Macedonia practically became an international 
protectorate [Gibas-Krzak 2011: 122]. On the grounds of the Ohrid Agreement 
signed on August 13, 2001, the Albanian minority was granted some privileges. 
The term “national minority” was abandoned and was substituted by terms such as 
“nations” or “ethnic communities” due to the appropriate changes in the constitu-
tion [Framework…; Amendments…]. The agreement covered the recognition of the 
Albanian language as the second official language, equal access of the Albanians to 
positions within the administration, the police and the army as well as the creation 
of a commission for the interethnic dialogue [Dymarski 2001: 220].
Since independence, the Republic of Macedonia began the process of social and 
political transformation. In 2005, FYROM achieved the status of a candidate for the 
EU membership. Despite the riots of 2001, the government managed to persuade 
the EU of its aspiration for democratisation of the country [Karadzoski, Adamczyk 
2015: 27, 29].
The integration of both communities is still facing some serious problems and 
the Albanian side is complaining of discrimination. In 2012, a series of fights on the 
ethnic grounds between the Macedonians and the Albanians took place. The ma-
jority of the society is anxious that a new conflict within the country may break out 
[Fleischerowicz 2012]. Albanian separatist sentiments are still growing and in the 
last few years a new crisis arose, initiated by the Albanian activists. In April 2017, 
Macedonian ministry of foreign affairs officially accused Albania of interference 
in the internal political affairs. A month before that president of Macedonia Ǵorge 
Ivanov announced that the demands of the Albanian minority posed the biggest threat 
to the sovereignty and unity of his society [Carpenter 2018].
On June 12, 2018, Macedonia’s Prime Minister Zoran Zaev and the Prime Min-
ister of Greece Alexis Tsipras confirmed the agreement on the change of name of 
Macedonia to the Republic of Northern Macedonia, in short North Macedonia (Prespa 
Agreement). Athens had been blocking Macedonian negotiations with the EU for 
many years because of the name of this state. No more than 37% of the Macedonians 
took part in the referendum of September 30, 2018 to decide about the change of the 
state’s name. According to law, the referendum is therefore invalid [Kokot 2018], but 
despite this, the Macedonian parliament pushed through the necessary constitutional 
changes, and on January 25, 2019, the Greek parliament approved the agreement. It 
came into force on February 12, 2019 [Statement…].
On June 26, 2018, the European Council adopted conclusions in which it decided 
to positively respond to the progress of Northern Macedonia and set the way for ne-
gotiations to start in June 2019, depending on progress in key areas, such as judicial 
reform, intelligence and security services reform as well as public administration 
reform [Council Conclusions on Enlargement and Stabilisation and Association 
Process, 26 June 2018]. On March 24, 2020, ministers for European affairs gave 
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their political agreement to the opening of accession negotiations with Albania and 
the Republic of North Macedonia [Video…]. On March 26, 2020, the members of 
the European Council endorsed the conclusions regarding enlargement, stabilization 
and association process [Council Conclusions on Enlargement and Stabilization and 
Association Process – Albania and the Republic of North Macedonia].
By ending the dispute over the name of the country in June 2018, representatives 
of NATO member states signed a protocol on the accession of North Macedonia to 
NATO on February 6, 2019 [NATO…]. The accession protocol came into force on 
March 19, 2020, allowing North Macedonia to deposit its documents of accession and 
thereby become the 30th member state of NATO on March 27, 2020 [Živković 2020].
MONTENEGRO
Montenegro is a proof that independence can be gained by peaceful means and 
with the acceptance of international community. The EU expressed its doubts that 
this independence might have led to the outbreak of another conflict in the Balkans, 
which actually occurred. As a result of the referendum of May 21, 2006, Montenegro 
officially separated from Serbia. The Republic of Serbia became a legal successor of 
the union of states. On June 3, 2006, the parliament of Montenegro proclaimed the 
independence. However, on June 22, 2006, Podgorica (the capital of Montenegro) 
established the diplomatic relations with Belgrade. For the existence of the country, 
it was important that its independence was recognized by both Russia and the USA. 
The independence of Montenegro made it difficult to keep Kosovo within the Federal 
Republic of Yugoslavia. The secession of Kosovo had a destabilizing effect on the 
international situation and has caused that the threat of separatist tendencies in the 
Balkans is increasing [Podgórzańska 2010: 8; Gibas-Krzak 2011: 128].
In 2003, Yugoslavia was renamed to Serbia and Montenegro – a loose federation 
of two republics with a common federal parliament. The agreement was set to be in 
force for at least three years and after that time Belgrade and Podgorica had to decide 
about remaining in the political relationship. Montenegro demanded independence 
after the termination of the agreement [Bichta, Wichmanowski 2013: 405].
The development of the situation in Kosovo had a huge impact on the future of 
Montenegro. On October 15, 2017, a so-called stabilization treaty was signed with the 
EU and on April 23, 2009, the Council of the European Union accepted the application 
of Montenegro to become a member of the EU [Gibas-Krzak 2011: 129]. In December 
2010, Montenegro received an official status of a candidate for the membership in the 
European Union and on June 5, 2016 it became the member of NATO.
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KOSOVO
Kosovo was an autonomous province of Serbia which from the times of con-
stitutional changes of 1974 had a status comparable to the federal republics. It was 
inhabited in 77.4% by Albanians. The number of Serbians was dropping gradually 
which was related to the lower birthrate and emigration from Serbia, mainly for 
economic reasons, but also because of the increasing nationalist tensions. Kosovo’s 
autonomy was liquidated by the Yugoslavian government in 1989 but it did not reduce 
the separatist sentiments. The situation led to further repressions from the central 
government. Albanian schools were closed, newspapers prohibited and the opposition 
activists were repressed [Bieńczyk-Missala, Pronińska 2012: 282]. In March 2004, 
a series of the most brutal attacks on the Serbians and KFOR forces since 1999 took 
place, carried out by the KlA [Gibas-Krzak 2011: 120]. 
On the one hand, the Albanians constitute the majority of this province and they 
refer to the demographic evidence for governing the region. On the other hand, 
the Serbians claim they have historical rights to Kosovo as it is the cradle of their 
statehood. Both sides of this conflict are relentless and it is impossible to reach 
a compromise.
On February 17, 2008, the parliament of Kosovo passed a twelve-point declaration 
of independence [see: Kosovo Declaration of Independence], which was boycotted 
by 11 Serbian members. The states of the world recognizing Kosovo, including some 
EU states and the USA, acknowledged the declaration of independence as a final act 
of Yugoslavian collapse, establishing a foundation for the peaceful cooperation in the 
Balkans. The states of the world which opposed the secession acknowledged this act as 
non-compliant with the international law, as the token of the domination of the western 
states which created a danger precedent and a threat to global security [Podgórzańska 
2010: 8; Gibas-Krzak 2011: 128]. Independence of Kosovo was recognized by some 
Balkan states, i.e. Albania, Bulgaria, Croatia and Slovenia. Bosnia and Herzegovina, 
Greece, Romania and Serbia did not recognize it and Macedonia and Montenegro 
eventually did it on October 9, 2008 [Harland 2010: 75].
It must be emphasized that in the circumstances of establishing independent 
states of Kosovo and Bosnia and Herzegovina both of the countries do not have 
a full sovereignty but are international protectorates, in which democratically elected 
authorities are subjected to the commissioners appointed by the international orga-
nizations who have a conclusive voice even over the parliamentary bodies of these 
countries [Sobczyński 2013: 225].
On October 10, 2008, the case of Kosovo was taken to the International Court of 
Justice (ICJ) in the Hague. The Belgrade government via the General Assembly of 
United Nations asked the Court if the Albanians’ decision on Kosovo’s independence 
was legal [Ker-lindsay 2020]. In its justification the Court stated that proclamation 
of Kosovo’s independence was not illegal and declared that international law does 
not contain “the prohibition on declarations of independence” [Trybunał…].
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On November 26, 2008, the UN Security Council decided to gradually substitute 
the UNMIK (United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo), which is 
the civilian administration of Kosovo, by an EU mission (EUlEX – European Un-
ion Rule of law Mission in Kosovo). It started its activities on December 9, 2008 
which means establishing a dual power because the UNMIK supervises the Serbi-
an administration and EUlEX supervises the Kosovan (Albanian) administration 
[Gibas-Krzak 2009: 102].
Serbians in Kosovo (most numerous in 4 Serbian municipalities in the north of 
the province) are reluctant to cooperate with and get involved in the activities of 
Kosovan state institutions and only follow the Serbian law. An important example 
of such an attitude was the general election held in May 2010 under the auspices of 
Belgrade. This situation poses a threat of a collapse of the province and a split into 
two parts. Albanian government in Prishtina (the capital city of Kosovo) emphasized 
that they would gladly dispose of the northern part of Kosovo in exchange for the 
Preševo Valley in southern Serbia, inhabited in 2/3 by Albanians, whose separatist 
aspirations are dangerous for the territorial integrity [Gibas-Krzak 2011: 120].
In March 2010, a conference concerning the security of western Balkans took 
place. It was not attended by the president of Serbia, Boris Tadić, not approving the 
presence of Kosovo representatives. According to Belgrade’s raison d’etat it could 
participate only as Kosovo-UNMIK [see: United Nations Mission…], but it was not 
accepted as such by the conference organizers – Croatia and Slovenia [Gibas-Krzak 
2011: 121].
Yet, in 2005, Serbia started the negotiations for associating with the EU. 
To achieve this, it was compelled to concede that Kosovo’s government could be rep-
resented at regional meetings and would not require the mediating signature of UNMIK 
for official agreements. In exchange, Prishtina accepted that its official name would carry 
the suffix * (a first in diplomatic history) which referred to the footnote ‘*. This designa-
tion is without prejudice to positions on status and is in line with UNSC Resolution 1244 
and the ICJ Opinion on the Kosovo Declaration of Independence’. [Glenny 2012: 685] 
In April 2008, it signed the Association and Cooperation Agreement and in De-
cember 2009, applied to become a member of the EU. In October 2011, the European 
Committee recommended granting the candidate status to Serbia to the European 
Council. Since March 2012, Serbia is officially a candidate [Bichta, Wichmanowski 
2013: 406]. A Stabilisation and Association Agreement between the EU and Serbia 
entered into force in September 2013. The first Intergovernmental Conference took 
place on January 21, 2014, signalling the formal start of Serbia’s accession negoti-
ations [European…]. 
A visit of the president of Russia Vladimir Putin in Serbia in 2014 showed that 
Moscow is interested in securing its interests in the Balkans. The Russia’s policy 
toward Serbia is getting more and more intensive but it is also more active towards the 
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Serbian minorities in neighbouring countries such as Bosnia and Herzegovina, Mon-
tenegro, and Kosovo, fitting in the broader plan for inhibition of the integration of the 
Balkan states with NATO and the EU [Szpala 2014: 1]. Early parliamentary elections 
in Serbia from April 24, 2016 have been won by the right-wing Serbian Progressive 
Party of Prime Minister Aleksandar Vučić winning the support of 48%. Co-governing 
of Vice Prime Minister Ivica Dačić reported a slight drop of support finishing with 
11% of votes. What is alarming is the fact that the elections have strengthened the 
nationalistic pro-Russian right wing: the Serbian Radical Party (SRP) gaining 8% 
and ideologically similar DSS-Dveri (with 5%) [Przedterminowe…]. Aleksandar 
Vučić, Serbia’s prime minister and the leader of centre-right Serbian Progressive 
Party, won the presidency on April 2, 2017. He emphasizes a firm EU integration 
course announcing Serbia’s accession to the EU between 2020 and 2025. 
A lot of anxiety was caused in Macedonia, Serbia, Montenegro and in Brussels 
by the words of Albanian Prime Minister Edi Rama from April 2015 who declared 
explicitly: “The unification of Albania and Kosovo is inevitable, whether in the 
European Union or outside the Union” [Górny 2017]. Kosovo is a reminder that the 
peace in the Balkans requires a constant interest.
CONClUSIONS
To sum up, there is no universal formula to solve the issue of separatisms as in 
every case there are different circumstances which must be taken into consideration. 
We cannot talk about the cultural pluralism in the Balkans which would secure the 
interests of the nation state as well as the national minorities. Separatism is a dynamic 
process related to the change of borders of the existing states and the creation of new 
countries. It can turn into civil wars. Often the goal of separatists is to establish their 
own homogenous ethnic “greater states”. Separatist tendencies are developing in the 
Balkans, and two developing nationalisms – Serbian and Albanian – play a key role 
as it is unknown whether an international society will manage to maintain the state of 
peace in the above-mentioned countries. The disintegration of Yugoslavia unleashed 
centrifugal forces that could intensify instability throughout the region. The poli-
cy-makers showed themselves unprepared for the solution of crisis in the Balkans.
The enlargement of the EU will contribute to the development of the Balkan 
states but first the solution of the nationality and ethnic issues in former Yugoslavia 
is required. The faster the integration of the former Yugoslavia with the EU, the more 
stable the region of the Balkan Peninsula will become. Major efforts should therefore 
be undertaken to accelerate the process of the integration of all these states with the 
EU and into the security structures of NATO. The task remains uncompleted.
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